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Airline Mergers: The Public Interest
in Labor Protective Provisions
By STANLEY B. RosFFimEn*
INTRODUCTION
Conditions of employment, wages and other benefits have
been steadily improving for employees of private industry. Con-
ditions for employees in the public sector have not kept pace.
The gains of the employee of private industry are based on his
ability to enforce his demands through strikes. The public em-
ployee has not had the coercive power to enforce his demands
because a strike in a public service or industry would affect the
general public. It is not in the public interest to allow public
services to be discontinued or curtailed. The public interest
would suffer if policemen, firemen, teachers or other public
employees were allowed to disrupt basic services.
Today, however, there is great upheaval in the. public sector.
More and more the right of a public employee to receive the same
terms, conditions and benefits as an employee in private industry
is being recognized. More and more the right of any employee,
whether public or private, to enforce his demands through strikes,
is being recognized. More and more the public employee is
viewed as having the same rights and privileges as an employee in
private industry. There are many recent examples of the ex-
panded privilege of the public employee. The most common
current example is the public school teacher.
In addition to the labor force in private industry and the
labor force in public industry, there is a third labor force, one
that may be characterized as quasi-public-quasi-public because
it has aspects of both private and public industry. It is private
because the source of capital and management is private industry.
It is, at the same time, public because it is subject to public
* Associate Professor of Law, New England School of Law; LL.B. University
of Minnesota, 1951; LL.M. S.M.U., 1969.
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regulation. This quasi-public labor force is found in the area of
public utility. The specific segment of public utility to which this
study is devoted is commercial aviation. Each commercial air
carrier is a private company, whose stock is handled in the same
manner as any other private corporation. The management is
private and is chosen by the stockholders as in the case of any
private corporation. The employees are technically working
for a private company and are a part of private industry. How-
ever, like all utilities, the airlines are subject to public regulation.
This regulation is provided by the Civil Aeronautics Board [here-
inafter referred to as Board or CAB]' and encompasses almost all
basic areas of management decision. The Board must approve:
entry into the field of commercial aviation;2 all routes3 including
expansion and abandonment of existing routes;4 all rates and
fares, including new rates and fares as well as increases or
decreases in existing rates and fares;5 all service to the public,
including new services or expansion or removal of existing serv-
ices;' and finally, even withdrawal from the field itself.' The
Board literally exercises absolute control over commercial opera-
tions of air carriers. Since the commercial air carriers are private,
but subject to public regulation in regard to all operations, the
characterization of "quasi-public" is appropriate.8
How does the labor force of a quasi-public industry fit the
mold of labor in other industries? Do airline employees have the
rights of private industry? Are they subject to the problems con-
fronted by public employees? It might be expected that the rights
of quasi-public employees would be similar to the rights of public
I Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1321 (1970).
249 U.S.C. § 1371(a) (1970).
349 U.S.C. § 1371(e) (1970).
449 U.S.C. § 1371(g), (j) (1970).
5 49 U.S.C. § 1373 (1970).
649 U.S.C. § 1371(e) (1970).
7 49 U.S.C. § 1378 (1970); while this section only provides for merger and
consolidation, this is the only method by which a commercial air carrier has been
allowed to withdraw from commercial aviation. R. CAvEs, Am TRANsPoRT AND Ivs
REcULATORS 176 (1962).
8 This regulation even extends to the private area of ownership in certain
instances. Board approval is required: for an individual or company who is an
air carrier, or engaged in some phase of aeronautics, to acquire control in any
manner of any other air carrier or company engaged in some phase of aeronautics
(49 U.S.C. § 1378 (1970) ); for an officer or director of one air carrier or company
engaged in some phase of aeronautics, to obtain a controlling interest in another
air carrier or company engaged in some phase of aeronautics (49 U.S.C. § 1379
(1970)); for any pooling or other contract or agreement betveen air carriers (49
U.S.C. § 1382 (1970)).
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employees since the same concern with public interest exists in
public utility as in public industry. However, there is one area
in which airline employees enjoy labor rights superior to the rights
of public employees-an area, in fact, in which the rights of air-
line employees are superior to the rights enjoyed by almost all
other employees, regardless of the industry or service performed,
and regardless of the employment classification as private, public
or quasi-public. This is the area of labor protective conditions
imposed upon a surviving air carrier in the event of an airline
merger.9
If Brick Company B is merged into Brick Company A, apart
from private agreement, there is no obligation on the part of Brick
Company A to retain the employees of Brick Company B. Neither
is there any obligation on Company A to make any provision for
those employees of either Company A or Company B who may be
terminated as a consequence of the merger. This is true although
it is recognized that a saving of personnel through elimination of
jobs and facilities is often a major objective of merger. The same
is not true, however, in the case of commercial air carriers. If
we substitute air carriers for brick companies, it will be necessary
for the Board to approve the proposed merger before it can be
effected.10 One of the requirements for approval of the merger
will be satisfactory protective conditions to insure that any em-
ployee put in a worse position by the merger will be compensated
for the loss he has sustained.
The disaccommodation caused by a strike in commercial
aviation would adversely affect the aviation segment of public
transportation. This adverse effect on the public interest is the
basis for labor protective provisions in an airline merger. It is an
attempt to avoid strikes by insuring employee protection. But is
there a greater public interest in preventing airline strikes than
in preventing strikes by firemen, policemen, or public school
teachers? Why do airline employees have protection which is not
available to employees in other areas of public or private industry?
What unique category provides such special rights? Is it in the
949 U.S.C. § 1378(b) (1970). This section refers to merger, consolidation,
purchase, lease, operating contract or acquisition of control. The reference through-
out this paper will be merger or merger transaction. Either of these terms is
intended to cover all of the items above.
10 Id.
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public interest to provide protective conditions not available in
private industry? Is it in the public interest to provide conditions
which will simply be added to the cost of the merger transaction
to be paid eventually by the public using the airlines? Are there
any public benefits to these labor protective conditions, or are
they simply provisions for the benefit of a relatively small group
at the expense of the general public?
At least a part of the reason for labor protective provisions is
provided by an historical analogy to the railroad industry. It is
the purpose of this work to look at the historical background to
determine if there ever was a valid basis for such analogy.
Assuming the analogy was valid when first adopted, is it still
valid today? Finally, is there a public interest which justifies
labor protective provisions in airline mergers, and if there is, what
is this public interest? The conclusion of this author is that air-
line labor protective provisions were based on the railroad
analogy; however, this analogy was not valid when first adopted,
and it is not valid today. In addition, it is the conclusion of this
writer that there is a public interest in uninterrupted air service,
but such public interest is no greater than the public interest in
any uninterrupted service, whether such is provided by private,
public, or quasi-public industry. If such protection is justifiable
in airline mergers it is likewise valid in any merger whether such
involves private, public or quasi-public companies.
I. LABOR PROTECTIVE PROVISIONS
A. United-Capital Provisions
In 1961, the largest airline merger in United States history
was approved by the Civil Aeronautics Board. This transaction
merged Capital Airlines, at the time the fifth largest domestic
carrier but on the verge of bankruptcy, into United Airlines, the
healthy, vigorous, second largest domestic airline. This merger
produced what was in 1961, and is still today, the largest domestic
air carrier in the United States." In order to secure approval of
the merger the surviving carrier was required to accept thirteen
conditions for the protection of the employees of both carriers.' 2
These conditions have become the standard labor protective
31 United-Capital Merger Case, 33 C.A.B. 307 (1961).
12Id. at 342.
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conditions which have been uniformly imposed in subsequent
airline mergers.
There are two basic purposes of labor protective conditions:
(1) to insure the integration of all employees of the newly merged
company as rapidly and efficiently as possible;13 and (2) to make
compensatory allowances to all adversely affected employees,
i.e., to provide allowances for a "displaced employee," one placed
in a worse position in regard to compensation than the position
occupied immediately .preceding the merger, or a "dismissed
employee," one deprived of his employment as a result of the
merger.' 4 An adversely affected employee must show that any
change in his position was due solely to the merger. If any part
of the change in his position is due to any cause other than the
merger, for example, general economic conditions, the employee
is not entitled to the protection of these conditions."5 The term
"employee" is defined to include all but temporary or part time
employees. 16
One requirement of the labor protective conditions is fair
and equitable integration of seniority lists. The protective pro-
visions require this to be done through collective bargaining
between the carrier and representatives of the employees.' 7 Upon
failure to agree through the collective bargaining process, the
matter may be submitted to arbitration. 8 The complexity and
difficulty of integration of seniority lists can best be illustrated by
example. Company B with 125 pilots is merged into Company A
with 400 pilots. The merged company anticipates a force of 500
pilots and will have 25 surplus pilots. How, and by whom, will it
be determined which 25 pilots are to be dismissed? Will all
dismissed pilots be from Company B, even though some have
substantially more experience than some pilots from Company A?
If such determination is made based on seniority, it may be
further complicated if Company A pilots have company wide
seniority, while Company B pilots have a separate seniority roster
at each base. Of equal importance is the method by which
seniority will be determined among the 500 pilots to be retained.
'8 Id. at 323.
'4 Id.
'5 Id. at 342 (APPENDIX A, Labor protective provisions).
16Id. (§ 2(d)).
17 Id. (§ 3).
18 Id. at 346 (§ 13).
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A complicating factor may be a difference in job description.
Suppose Company B has flight engineers while all Company A
cockpit personnel are required to be qualified pilots. The com-
plexity and scope of potential problems is limitless. In each case
it is necessary to combine each individual belonging to craft or
class of Carrier A in a fair and equitable manner with the indi-
viduals belonging to the corresponding craft or class of Carrier B
into one new integrated seniority list.
Other major provisions for labor protection include a require-
ment that the company resulting from the merger pay an allow-
ance to any employee displaced by the merger, i.e., any employee
who, though retained by the merged company, through seniority
of another employee or through phasing out of a position, is
placed in a worse position in regard to compensation than the
position occupied immediately prior to the merger.19 This allow-
ance is the difference between the displaced employee's new pay
and his average pay based on the average number of hours worked
per month, during the twelve months preceeding the merger
transaction. 0 Eligibility for a displacement allowance requires
displacement within three years of the effective date of the
merger. After three years, a displacement cannot be considered
to have been occasioned by the merger transaction.21 The dis-
placement allowance shall continue for a period not to exceed
four years from the date of displacement. 2
If any employee is deprived of his employment as a result
of the merger, rather than being retained as a displaced employee,
he shall be entitled to a monthly allowance equal to 60% of his
average pay immediately preceding the merger. This dismissal
allowance extends for a period ranging from six months to five
years, depending on his length of service with the carrier.23 The
dismissed employee has the option of taking a lump-sum separa-
tion allowance in lieu of the monthly dismissal allowance. This
allowance, like the monthly dismissal allowance, is based on the
length of service to the carrier. If an employee elects to take the
lump-sum separation allowance, he must resign and take such
19 Id. at 343 (§ 4(a)).
201d. (§ 4(c)).
21 Id.
221d. (§ 4(d)).
23Id. at 343-44 (§ 5).
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settlement in lieu of all other rights and protection thereunder.24
While an employee may be offered an alternate position by
the carrier, no employee is required to accept employment that
is not within the craft, class or field of endeavor in which he was
previously employed in order to be eligible for the protection of
these conditions.2 5 However, an employee may be required to
relocate his residence to retain his position with the surviving
company. If the move is required within three years of the
merger, the company is required to provide moving and travel
expenses. 6 Provision is also made to protect the employee from
loss in the sale of his home or disposal of an unexpired lease on a
dwelling.
2 7
Finally, in case the parties are unable to agree on any pro-
vision under any of the protective conditions, either party may
submit the dispute to arbitration as agreed upon between the
parties. 8
B. Amendments to United-Capital Protective Conditions
While the standard labor protective conditions were finally
established in the United-Capital case, labor protective conditions
were not originated in this case. The first case considering labor
protection was in 1947.29 This case was followed by eleven addi-
tional cases in the thirteen intervening years during which the
standard United-Capital provisions evolved. 0 Neither the unions
nor the carriers were satisfied with the provisions of United-Capi-
tal. In the cases through 1971, a continuing effort to amend these
conditions has been made. Some of the areas in which change
has been most urgently requested would include:
24 Id. at 345 (§ 7).
2 5 1d. at 346 (§ 12).
201d. at 345 (§ 8(a)).
271d. (§ 9).
281d. at 346-47 (§ 13).
2 9 United-Western, Acquisition of Air Carrier Property, 8 C.A.B. 298 (1947).50Mackay-Midet Acquisition Case, 24 C.A.B. 51 (1956); Colonial-Eastern
Acquisition Case, 23 C.A.B. 500 (1956); Wien-Alaska Air Acquisition of Byers, 23
C.A.B. 428 (1956); Continental-Pioneer Acquisition Case, 20 C.A.B. 323 (1955);
Flying Tiger-Slick Merger Case, 18 C.A.B. 326 (1954); Delta-Chicago & Southern
Merger Case, 16 C.A.B. 647 (1952); West Coast-Empire Merger Case, 15 C.A.B.
971 (1952); Braniff-Mid-Continent Merger Case, 15 C.A.B. 708 (1952); North
Atlantic Route Transfer Case, 12 C.A.B. 124 (1950); United-Western, Acquisition
of Carrier Property, 11 C.A.B. 701 (1950); Monarch-Challenger Merger Case, 11
C.A.B. 33 (1949).
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(1) Instead of requiring the employee to prove the merger
was the cause of his displacement, simply allowing the
employee to show the merger, and then shifting the
burden of proof to require the carrier to prove that such
displacement or dismissal was not caused by the merger.
The basis for this change is that the information required
for proof is solely in the possession of the carrier. In
addition, even if the employee could get such information,
the cost would prevent him from doing so. 3'
(2) Requiring the merger of seniority lists as a pre-condition
to approval of the merger. Under such a provision, ap-
proval by the Civil Aeronautics Board of the merger it-
self would be required to be delayed until all merger of
seniority list matters had been settled between the carriers
involved in the merger and the affected unions.3 2
(3) Redefining "displaced employee" from one who is placed
in a worse position in regard to compensation by the
merger, to an employee placed in a worse position in re-
gard to compensation or in regard to rules and regulations
and working conditions. In addition, it is argued that the
average wage on which displacement compensation is
based, should be adjusted by increases granted to em-
ployees not further affected by the merger. Further, the
period during which an employee may become displaced
should be increased from three to five years because of
the possibility that all changes brought about by the
merger transaction will not be effected within three years.
Finally it is requested that the period during which the
displacement allowance is paid be increased from four
to five years. 33
(4) Raising the dismissal allowance to 100% of the dismissed
employee's average income, the same as the displacement
W1 Northwest-Northeast Merger Case, No. 21819, Order Nos. 70-12-162, 70-12-
163 (C.A.B., Dec. 31, 1970); American-Trans Caribbean Merger Case, No. 21828,
Order No. 70-12-161 (C.A.B., Dec. 31, 1970); Allegheny-Lake Central Merger
Case, No. 19151, Order No. E-26967 C.A.B., June 24, 1968); Agreement of
Merger, Bonanza Airlines, West Coast Airlines, Pacific Airlines, No. 18996 (C.A.B.,
1967); Colonial-Eastern Acquisition Case, 23 C.A.B. 500 (1956).
32 merean-Trans Caribbean Merger Case, No. 21828, Order No. 70-12-161
C.A.B., Dec. 31, 1970); Delta-Chicago & Southern Merger Case, 16 C.A.B. 647
1952); Braniff-Mid-Continent Merger Case, 15 C.A.B. 971 (1952); Monarch-
Challenger Merger Case, 11 C.A.B. 33 (1949).
33 Northwest-Northeast Merger Case, No. 21819, Order Nos. 70-12-162,
70-12-163 (C.A.B., Dec. 31, 1970); Allegheny-Lake Central Merger Case, No.
19151, Order No. E-26967 (C.A.B., June 24, 1968); Continental-Pioneer Acquisi-
tion Case, 20 C.A.B. 323 (1955); Flying Tiger-Slick Merger Case, 18 C.A.B. 326
(1954).
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allowance. The United-Capital provision called for 60%
of average income in case of displacement. The basis of
this argument is that an employee should not be further
penalized if he is dismissed rather than if he is only dis-
placed. The employee who has been terminated because
of the merger should be entitled to an allowance at least
as large as that provided the employee who is only dis-
placed 34
The four points above represent a summary of the major
changes which have been requested, but no attempt has been
made to note every change which may have been requested from
time to time. The requested changes have been resisted by the
carriers, and their position has been sustained by the Board on
the basis that the provisions, as set out in the United-Capital
case, have generally worked well. Before any changes will be
allowed there must be an affirmative showing of some mitigating
circumstances requiring a change. Until such is shown, it is in
the best interest of all to provide conditions which have proven
successful and which can be relied upon. "The Board's standard
procedures have proven 'singularly successful' in accomplishing
the objectives; proponents of change must demonstrate clearly
that their alternative offers genuine advantages."35
C. Airline Basis for Labor Protective Provisions
There is no specific requirement in the Federal Aviation Act36
requiring labor protection. The only provision in the Act relating
to merger transactions requires the Board to approve of proposed
merger, unless it finds that such merger transaction will not be
consistent with the public interest. 7 This section goes on to
provide that such approval may be: "Upon such terms and
conditions as it shall find to be just and reasonable and with
such modifications as it may prescribe."
3 8
3' Northwest-Northeast Merger Case, No. 21819, Order Nos. 70-12-162,
70-12-163 (C.A.B., Dec. 31, 1970); Colonial-Eastern Acquisition Case, 23 C.A.B.
500 (1956); Continental-Pioneer Acquisition Case, 20 C.A.B. 323 (1955); North
Atlantic Route Transfer Case, 12 C.A.B. 124 (1950).
35 Northwest-Northeast Merger Case, No. 21819, Order Nos. 70-12-162, 70-12-
163, at 22 (C.A.B., Dec. 31, 1970).
3649 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq. (1970).
37 49 U.S.C. § 1378(b) (1970).
38Id.
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A merger transaction may include benefits to the stockholders
of the companies involved. It will also ordinarily involve benefits
to the general public through new or improved services and/or
equipment. These benefits to the public and the stockholders
may be at the expense of some of the employees involved through
loss of jobs or seniority. It is, however, reasonable to consider
labor a part of the public and entitled to protection as part of
the public interest. If labor, as part of the public, is damaged, at
least to this extent, the merger transaction will not be in the public
interestf9
Essentially, the solution involves balancing the public interest
and the protection of labor. It is in the public interest to allow
business to operate as free of restriction and condition as possible.
The interest in giving the successor carrier complete discretion
in the consolidation of its operation without regard to the effect
on its employees must be balanced against the interest in provid-
ing protection for any employee injured by a merger transaction.
40
The result has been a compromise. The surviving carrier is al-
lowed discretion on retention, transfer and dismissal of its labor
forces, but at the same time conditions are imposed to assure
some protection to the adversely affected employees. 1
The difficulty with balancing public interests is not in the
weight given to each, but rather in defining what are public
interests. The Federal Aviation Act refers to public interest, but
does not define the term. The airline cases have not considered
a definition of the public interest. It is assumed. The Board has
only made determinations of which of the assumed public interests
carry the greatest weight.
In adopting labor protective conditions, the Board was not
charting a new path. It was following the path explored by the
Interstate Commerce Commission in regard to the railroads, a
path which the I.C.C. began charting long in advance of the air-
lines. It is not surprising that the Interstate Commerce Conmis-
sion was looked to for guidance. The Civil Aeronautics Act itself
was patterned on the Interstate Commerce Act, and the Civil
Aeronautics Board has looked to the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission for guidance in those areas virgin to airline regulation.
89 United-Western, Acquisition of Air Carrier Property, 11 C.A.B. 701 (1950).
40 See North Atlantic Route Transfer Case, 12 C.A.B. 124 (1958).
41 United-Western, Acquisition of Air Carrier Property, 11 C.A.B. 701 (1950).
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In addition, the Interstate Commerce Commission was established
to regulate the railroad industry in 1887,42 while similar regulation
of the airlines was not adopted until more than fifty years later.
43
To determine the validity of the airline adoption of railroad pro-
visions, it is necessary to look to the railroad history of labor
protective provisions.
D. Historical Basis for Airline Labor Protective Provisions: The
Railroads
Today we look at the plight of the railroads, particularly with
reference to passenger service, and the tendency is to consider
this difficulty as a post World War II problem. The railroads,
however, were in serious financial trouble long before World
War II. There was Congressional recognition of the problem
shortly after World War I, in the Transportation Act of 1920, in
which the established national policy was declared to be consoli-
dation of the railroads in the interest of economy and efficiency.
44
In the preparation of a plan to implement this Congressional
mandate, the Interstate Commerce Commission found that any
great savings resulting from consolidations would be effected at
the expense of two groups: the railroad security holders and the
employees. The Commission estimated that 75% of the savings
would be at the expense of the employees. Such harsh conse-
quences could so seriously affect employee morale, however, as to
require mitigation both in the interest of successful prosecution
of the Congressional policy and in the efficient operation of the
industry itself.45 The hardship created by this policy, therefore,
had to be alleviated. Congress had previously established a
pattern of protection for employees in the railroad industry upon
which it was now in a position to build further.46 The Interstate
4 2 The Interstate Commerce Act, 24 Stat. 379 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C.
§ 1 et seq. (1964).
4 8 The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 973; for a general history of
the relationship between the Civil Aeronautics Act and the Interstate Commerce
Act, see Rosenfield, A Case for the Legality of Youth Standby and Young Adult
Airline Fares, 36 J. Am L. & CoM. 615, ch. VI (1970).
44 41 Stat. 491 (1920).
4528 MoNTHLY LABoR REvmw 1191 (1929); 43 MozNramy LABoR REvimw
867 (1936).
4The Safety Appliance Act of 1893, 27 Stat. 531 (safety)- The Hours of
Service Act of 1907, 34 Stat. 1415 (hours of employment); The Federal Employer's
Lability Act of 1908, 35 Stat. 65 (safety and welfare); The Adamson Act of
1916, 39 Stat. 721 (wages), as amended, 48 Stat. 1283 (1934), and 50 Stat. 307
(1937) (retirement and pension).
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Commerce Commission early recognized the interest of the rail-
roads in employee relations. In 1892, in its annual report, the
Commission declared that "relations existing between railway
corporations and their employees are always in their public
interest."4 7
In 1933, the Emergency Railroad Transportation Act was
adopted.4" The purpose of this bill was to encourage and pro-
mote or require action on the part of the carriers to avoid un-
necessary duplication of services and facilities. This Act provided,
in part, that no railroad employee in service in May, 1933, could
be deprived of his employment or be placed in a worse position
with respect to his compensation by reason of any action taken
under the Act.49 The Federal Coordinator of Railroads, appointed
under the above-mentioned Act, recommended a comprehensive
system of dismissal compensation in order to ". . . enhance the
safety or efficiency of railroad service."5 It was urged that man-
agement and employees negotiate this agreement rather than
having it provided by legislation. A negotiated agreement be-
tween the parties involved would prove superior to any legislation.
Three months of face-to-face bargaining followed. The result
was the Washington Agreement entered into May 31, 1936. 5'
This agreement was signed by 219 (the vast majority) of the na-
tion's railroads and by 21 labor organizations. 2 The agreement
went into effect June 18, 1936, for a period of five years.
53
The major provisions of this agreement called for an allowance
for any employee affected by a railroad coordination providing
the effect was caused solely by the coordination. The provisions
of this agreement did not apply if the changes to an affected
employee were brought about solely by other causes.5 4 A coordi-
47 SLvxr ANNuAL REP RT OF THE INTERSTATE COMMRCE Con.sisoN 323
(1892).
48 48 Stat. 217 (1933).
49Id. (§ 5(2)(f)).
SO H.R. Doc. No. 394, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 56 (1936).
51 Hearings on H.R. 2531 Before the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., vol. 1, at 231 (1939) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].5 2 There were 782 compianies but many had interests in others. The Class I
railroads 139) were responsible for 97% of the total revenue of all railways and
93% of the road mileage in 1936. A Class I railroad is one whose annual operaig
revenue exceeds $100,000. H.R. Doc. No. 583, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., vol. 16, at
22 (1938).
53 Hearings, supra note 51, at 236 (§ 15).
54 Id. at 232 (§ 1).
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nation was defined as any joint action of two or more carriers to
unify their facilities or operations, either in whole or in part.y
All parties agreed to apply the provisions to any coordination
while the agreement was in force. If any party to a coordination
was a party to the agreement, such party agreed the coordination
would be made only on the basis of the agreement. Thus, the only
coordination to which these conditions would not be applicable
would be a coordination between carriers, none of whom was a
party to the agreement.56
A carrier was required to give employees 90 days' notice of
an intended coordination and to include a statement of proposed
changes and an estimate of the number of employees thereby
affected. A conference was to be held within 30 days for the
purpose of reaching agreement on the application of the agree-
ment.57 Where employees would be displaced by the coordina-
tion, selection of those would be from all involved carriers on a
basis appropriate to the occasion. If this was not possible, the
question would be submitted to binding arbitration."8 The heart
of the protective provisions provided that no employee because
of a coordination would be placed in a worse position in respect
to compensation or rules governing working conditions for a
period of five years.59
If an employee was displaced because of the coordination,
he was entitled to a displacement allowance equal to 60% of his
average monthly compensation based on his income over the
preceding year. The length of the period during which the dis-
placement allowance was to be paid would depend on the length
of service with the railroad. 60 An employee had the option of
taking a lump sum settlement in lieu of the coordination allow-
ance and resigning from the company without further rights. The
amount of the lump sum settlement depended on length of
service.0'
If an employee was required to move his place of residence
as a result of, and within three years of, the coordination, the
55Id. (§ 2(a)).156ld. (§ 3(a))
57 Id. (§ 4).
5s Id. at 232-33 (§5).
591d. at 233 (§ 6(a)).
6o Id. at 233-34 (§7).
61 d. at 235 (§ 9).
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company paid the cost of moving the employee and his family.
Further, if moved and then furloughed within three years of the
date of coordination, the employee had the option of being moved
back to his first residence at company expense.2 Where an
employee was required to move his place of residence because
of the coordination, provision was made to prevent loss by forced
disposition of the residence, whether the employee owned the
premises or was renting. 3 Finally, in case of disagreement
between the parties under the agreement, any dispute was to be
submitted to binding arbitration.
6 4
A comparison of the Washington Agreement with the terms
provided in the United-Capital merger make it readily apparent
that while the airline agreement was narrower, its basis was
the Washington Agreement. In fact, the Washington Agreement
has provided the basis for all subsequent protective provisions in
both the railroad and airline industries.
While the Washington Agreement was a basis for labor pro-
tection in railroad mergers, labor considered it no more than a
beginning point. At the time of this agreement, the terms were
considered the best that could be obtained.6" It is not surprising,
in the light of the above history, that in the cases subsequent to
the adoption of the Washington Agreement, railroad employee
groups devoted considerable time to securing broader provisions.
An early result was a decision of the United States Supreme Court
that the Interstate Commerce Commission had the power, even
without the Washington Agreement, to prescribe labor protective
conditions.6 This power was later codified in the Transportation
Act of 1940 by a requirement that protection be provided em-
ployees affected by a railroad coordination. 67 Under this statute,
the Commission was required, as a condition of its approval of
62 Id. at 235 (§ 10(b)).
63Id. at 235-36 (§ 11).
64 Id. at236 (§ 13).
65 The employee groups believed they were entitled to more liberal provisions
and would continue to strive for such. Statement of Ceo. Harrison, Chairman, Rail-
way Labor Executives' Association, the Organization representing the organized
employees, made before the H. of Rep., Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce, Feb. 3, 1939.
66 United States v. Lowden, 308 U.S. 225 (1939).
67 The Transportation Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 905, amending the Interstate Com-
merce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1970); Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v.
United States, 339 U.S. 142 (1949).
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any coordination, to insure a fair and equitable arrangement to
protect the railroad employees affected.68
E. Amtrak and the Airlines
In 1970, the Rail Passenger Service Act became law."0 This
Act created the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Rail-
pax), designed to take over and operate intercity passenger rail
service, the system popularly known as Amtrak. The Act requires
fair and equitable arrangements to protect the interests of
employees affected by discontinuance of intercity rail service.
70
The railroads and unions were given an opportunity to agree to a
plan of protection through the collective bargaining process.
They were unable to agree to the provisions to be adopted,
however, and it was left to Secretary of Labor Hodgson to provide
the labor protective conditions. These conditions will be part
of any agreement by which the National Railroad Passenger
Corporation takes over the intercity passenger service of a rail-
road. This plan went into effect May 1, 1971, ". . . to protect
the interests of employees who are displaced or dismissed as a
result of the new route system created by the National Railroad
Passenger Corp."
71
These provisions are based upon the Washington Agreement
of 1936, although they are expanded and broadened. Their major
purpose is the protection of employees affected by discontinuance
of intercity rail passenger service. However, instead of requiring
the employee to show that displacement was caused by the
merger transaction, the railroad must show that the effect on the
employee was caused by something other than the merger trans-
action. The burden of proof has been shifted from the employee
to the carrier.72
The period of protection is extended from four years to six
years and extends from the date of displacement, rather than
from the date of the merger transaction.7 3 The exact maximum
0849 U.S.C. § 5(2)(f) (1970).
O0Rafl Passenger Service Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-518, 83 Stat. 1327
[hereinafter cited as Pub. L. No. 91-518].70 These provisions are designed as Appendices C-1, C-2 and C-3, under §
405 of Pub. L. No. 91-518.
71 U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, P FSS BLAsE 71-217, April 16, 1971.
72 Id. (Appendix C-1, preamble).
73id. at 2 (Art. I(1)(d)).
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protective period will depend on the length of employment in
accordance with the formula in Section 7(b) of the Washington
Agreement. 4 A dismissed employee has the option to take a
dismissal allowance and to continue to participate in all fringe
benefits to which he would otherwise be entitled, 5 or he may
take a lump sum settlement in lieu of all other benefits. 6 If the
employee selects the dismissal allowance, it is based on 100%
of the average monthly income, the same as the displacement
allowance.7
Any worker who has to move his place of residence due to a
job site change brought about by a discontinuation of rail service
will receive moving expenses for himself and his family. Further,
if such an employee is furloughed within three years after trans-
ferring to another job site and chooses to move back where he
was previously employed, the railroad will pay moving expenses .7
If an employee so requests, he may be granted priority to fill a
position in a different class or craft for which he is, or by retraining
can become, qualified for. Retraining is to be provided at carrier
expense. Such, however, may not contravene any collective
bargaining agreement. 9
Benefits are applicable, not only to railroad employees, but
also have been expanded to include workers in other railroad
related enterprises owned, used by, or which use the railroads,
including such operations as railway express and rail ferry
companies.11
This recitation is not an exhaustive list of the changes brought
about by Amtrak labor provisions. It is intended merely to
illustrate the reliance on the Washington Agreement as a founda-
tion, together with the expansion, improvements and increased
labor benefits provided by this 1971 development.
At the time of the Amtrak legislation, the airlines were in a
period of greater merger activity than had ever been experienced
in commercial aviation history. This period has seen the filing of
14 Id.
75 Id. at 10 (Art. 1(8)).
7eid. (Art. 1(7)).r7ld. ( r.I8 . __
78 Id. at 10-12 (Art. 1(9)).
701d. at 17 (Art. II(1)).
so Id. at 18 (Art. III).
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nine major merger applications before the Board." In addition,
others are in the negotiation or shopping stage. 2 Of the 12 trunk
airlines,"3 only United is free of at least rumor that it is looking
for a merger partner, and this is because, as the largest domestic
air carrier, United is considered to have reached the maximum
acceptable size.
This activity in the commercial aviation field has brought with
it increased pressure to expand the United-Capital labor pro-
visions at least to the level of the Amtrak provisions. The Board
declared that the standard labor protective provisions, that is,
those adopted in the United-Capital merger, 84 were singularly suc-
cessful and that no changes would be made therein until there
was a positive demonstration of the advantage offered by a
proposed alternative.8 5 This was further supplemented by stan-
dards for determining acceptability of domestic merger agree-
ments, which were adopted by the Department of Transportation
in consultation with the Department of Justice. 6 These rules
were issued August 31, 1971, and provided that protection
afforded labor in the merging firm should be in acordance with
the present policies of the Board, specifically noting that changes
in the United-Capital provisions were rejected in the Northwest-
Northeast Merger, 7 the last airline merger decided prior to adop-
81 National-Northeast Merger Case, No. 23852 (C.A.B., 1971); Allegheny-
Mohawk Merger Case, No. 23371 (C.A.B., 1971); Delta-Northeast Merger Case,
No. 23315 (C.A.B., 1971); American-Western Merger Case, No. 22916 (C.A.B.,
1970); Eastern-Caribair Merger Case, No. 22690 (C.A.B., 1971); Aloha-Hawaiian
Merger Case, No. 22435 (C.A.B., 1970); Universal-American Flyers Merger Case,
No. 22123 (C.A.B., 1970); American-Trans Caribbean Merger Case, No. 21828
(C.A.B., 1970); and Northwest-Northeast Merger Agreement, No. 21819 (C.A.B.,
1970).82 For just two of many examples that could be given: Trans-World Airlines
and Braniff Airlines have agreed in principle to merge. AvIATION WEEK & SPACE
TECHNOLOGY, Oct. 11, 1971, at 23. Pan-American Airways and Eastern Airlines
have discussed merger. AvIAToN W=n & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, Feb. 15, 1971, at
36.
83 United Airlines, Eastern Air Lines, Trans-World Airlines, American Airlines,
Pan-American World Airways, Northwest Airlines, Northeast Airlines, Braniff Air-
ways Delta Airlines, National Airlines, Continental Air Lines, Western Airlines.
This list has now been reduced to 11, with the approval of the merger of Northeast
into Delta Airlines. (No. 23315, Order Nos. 72-5-73, 72-5-74 (C.A.B., April 24,
1972).
84 United-Capital Merger Case, 33 C.A.B. 307 (1961).8 5 NorthwestNoeast Merger Case, No. 21819, Order No. 70-12-162 (C.A.B.,
Dec. 31, 1970).8 6 UNrrE STATE S Da'ar OF TRANsPoRTAToN, ExEcUTvE BRANCH CrrERA
For DOMETC AmiNE MERGER PRoPosALS, Aug. 31, 1971.8 7 Northwest-Northeast Merger Case, No. 21819, Order No. 70-12-162
(C.A.B., Dec. 31, 1970).
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tion of these standards.8 This policy was reaffirmed, and the
expanded provisions of Amtrak rejected, in the latest Board
decision considering labor protective provisions, decided in
March, 1972.89
II. PUBLIC INTEREST IN LAB OR PRoTEcTmE PRovIsioNs
A. Defining Public Interest
To determine whether labor protective provisions in airline
mergers are in the public interest, it is necessary to consider the
term "public interest" itself. The term is used often, but seldom
defined. What does the term "public interest" mean? The
unabridged dictionary does not define the term, but it does
define "public" as "relating to, or affecting the people as an
organized community"; "devoted to the general or national wel-
fare"; "the people as a whole."90 "Interest" is defined as "to con-
cern, be of importance"; "to involve the interest or welfare of.""'
Public interest is defined by a legal dictionary as something in
which the public has some interest by which their legal rights or
liabilities are affected. It cannot cover an area so narrow as to
be mere curiosity, or the interests of particular localities which
may be affected by the matter in question. It refers to the com-
munity at large.92
Public interest concerns the community as a whole, rather
than any individual or group of individuals. In concept this is
clear. In application a problem may arise where a substantial
group is involved. How is a determination made whether such
group is individual or the public in general? The airline unions
represent a large number of individual employees. Is the collec-
tive membership of these unions sufficient to be considered a
public interest? What number of individuals is adequate to
change a group from individuals to the community as a whole?
There is no precise line dividing that which concerns only a
group of individuals and that which falls within the public
interest.
88 Supra note 86, at 8.
89 Allegheny-Mohawk Merger Case, No. 23371, Order Nos. 72-4-31, 72-4-32
(C.A.B., March 28, 1972).
00 WEnsi-a's NE w INT E ATiONAL DICTIoNAnY 1836 (3d unabr. ed. 1961).
91 Id. at 1178.
92 BLACk'S LAw DICrIONA Y 1393 (4th ed. 1968).
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The Federal Aviation Act93 speaks of public interest in various
instances: in the policy section, consideration of enumerated
items is required in the public interest;94 no route may be
abandoned unless such abandonment is found to be in the public
interest;9 5 no foreign carrier may engage in foreign air transporta-
tion unless such transportation is in the public interest;96 the
Civil Aeronautics Board may waive the 30 day notice required of
a change in rates when such is in the public interest;9 7 the Civil
Aeronautics Board shall approve a consolidation or merger unless
it finds that such is not consistent with the public interest;"
finally, the rule of ratemaking shall consider the public interest.99
These varied references in the Federal Aviation Act indicate
that Congress considered public interest of prime importance.
Nowhere, however, did Congress define public interest nor did
it spell out the factors to be considered in a determination of the
public interest. Rather than a failure on the part of Congress, this
omission expressed an intention to refrain from a definition which
might limit the scope of the Act. The concept of public interest
is not subject to a static, universal definition. What is in the public
interest may depend upon the circumstances, the time, and the
parties involved, as well as upon various other factors.
The section referring to abandonment of routes is a good
example.100 Is it in the public interest to abandon a route that
five members of the public are using a day? At least to those
five members of the public it is against their interest. If the
general public means the public in general, speaking of a broad
spectrum of the public, then five individuals would not constitute
the public. This may be so, but where is the point at which
reference is to the general public rather than individual members
of the public? If this route to be abandoned is multiplied by 100,
500 or 1,000, is it still referring to individual members of the
public or have they now become the general public? Would it
93 Supra note 1.
94 49 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970).
05 49 U.S.C. § 1371(-) (1970).
9049 U.S.C. § 1372 b) (1970).
9749 U.S.C. § 1373(c) (1970).
98 49 U.S.C. § 1378(b) (1970).
99 49 U.S.C. § 1482(e) (2) (1970).
100 Supra note 95.
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make a difference if the number on each route was ten or 50
instead of five?
Assuming a public interest, it will be necessary to determine
if other public interests are involved. If so, appropriate action
will be determined by a balance of interests. An example is
economic feasibility of air service. An airline will provide service
to a city large enough to provide a profitable operation, but will
it provide service to a town too small to economically support air
transportation? It could not be said there is no public interest
in small towns, or that the needs of the population of a small
town does not constitute public interest. The public interest in
providing service to a small town would have to be weighed
against economic viability of the airline, the public interest in
keeping the means of public transportation solvent.
Public interest may vary according to the interest of the group
involved. Barely 50% of the United States population has ever
flown. To the half that has never flown, any government money
devoted to aviation, such as the cost of operating the Board itself,
will be only a cost without benefit. The only advantage is to the
portion of the public who, by use, benefit from aviation. Who
comprises this group differs from time to time, as does the size
of the group.
What is in the public interest today may not be in the public
interest tomorrow. One group constituting a unit with public
interest today may have none tomorrow. One public interest not
sufficient to outweigh other factors today may be ample tomorrow.
The term public interest is not capable of precise definition
because it is never static. The prevailing public interest can be
determined only by application of general principles to a par-
ticular situation.
B. Airlines v. Railroads
Labor protective provisions in the railroad industry were
based on a Congressional policy specifically expressed in 1920,101
which encouraged railroad mergers because of the oversupply of
railroads and because of the weak financial position of the rail
carriers. This policy became more important in the 1930's when
101 Supra note 44.
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the United States was in a period of depression with widespread
unemployment. 10 2 The policy of encouraging mergers could only
lead to further unemployment, even though it would have the
advantage of consolidating and strengthening rail transportation.
What would provide the greatest benefit for the country as a
whole, i.e., what would be the best policy for the benefit of the
public interest? Unquestionably, a policy which expanded unem-
ployment during a depression would not be in line with the public
interest in improvement of the economy. A balance of the cost
to the railroads, vis-h.-vis the benefit of extending employment,
or at least providing compensation for any extension of unemploy-
ment would be required.
The public had a two-fold involvement. First, there was an
interest in the cost of passenger transportation. This was of
primary concern to those members of the general public using
railroad transportation. The second involvement was broader in
scope-the interest in encouragement of the economy and dis-
couragement of extended unemployment. There is little difficulty
in determining where the greater public interest lay, and which
involvement had the greater effect. This was an extreme situation,
and it put a relatively small group, that portion traveling by
railroad, against an infinitely larger group, the whole population
of the United States. Because the situation was urgent, Congress
was able to take action which might otherwise have been con-
sidered extreme in its scope. This action was the specific legisla-
tive provision requiring that employee protection be provided
in carrying out the expressed Congressional policy of railroad
merger.
10 3
Today conditions in the railroad industry are, again, at a low
ebb. Consideration must be given to the cost to the general
public, as well as to the cost to one industry, the railroads, which
has been on the verge of bankruptcy. In the introduction of
Railpax, Congress has again specifically declared a policy that
it is in the public interest to make provision for dismissed or
displaced employees. 10 4 Certainly it is not unreasonable to con-
102 For example, in 1936, at the depth of the depression, 37 of 139 Class I
railroads were in receivership or trusteeship. H.R. Doc. No. 583, 75th Cong., 3d
Sess., vol. 16, at 25 (1938).
103 Supra note 48.
104 48 U.S.C. § 565 (1970).
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elude that Congress has recognized an extreme situation and
provided a radical remedy.
When the airline mergers were first considered it was reason-
able to look to the railroad industry for guidance because regula-
tion in the aviation industry was patterned on regulation in the
railroad industry.10 5 It was not reasonable, however, to simply
accept railroad regulation as automatically applicable to airlines
without independent consideration given to the differences and
times faced by the railroads vis-a'-vis the airlines. By the time
the question of airline merger and employee protection was
first raised,10 6 the railroads had twenty-seven years of explicitly
expressed Congressional policy; 0 7 eleven years with the industry
accepted Washington Agreement; 10 8 and, seven years with a
specific statutory provision for railroad labor protective condi-
tions.' Yet in the airline industry there was no expressed Con-
gressional policy either in regard to merger or to employee pro-
tection. With the importance and consideration given the ques-
tion in the railroad industry it is difficult to comprehend that this
matter was simply "overlooked" when it came to considering
aviation. This is particularly true because railroad and aviation
legislation were both considered by the same men and the
same Committees in Congress. 10
A more realistic assumption is that any omission in the aviation
field was intentional. In support of this argument is the fact that
economic regulation of commercial aviation was first adopted by
Congress in 1938,111 at a time when aviation was struggling to
get a start and to compete with other forms of transportation.
The struggle was to get a start, not to reduce the competitors to
a small number who could economically compete. By railroad
standards the number of commercial air carriers has never been
large.
In the late 1940's and early 1950's, when airline mergers were
first receiving serious consideration, loss of employee jobs was
105 C. RHYNE, THE CrVm AERONAICS Acr ANNOTATED (1939).
106 United-Western, Acquisition of Air Carrier Property, 8 C.A.B. 298 (1947).
107 The Transportation Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 491 (1920).
108 The Washington Agreement was adopted June 18, 1936.
10 9 Supra note 67.
130 The Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce and the House of Repre-
sentatives Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.
"'l The Civil Aeronautics Act, 52 Stat. 973 (1938).
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not a major problem. The airlines were in the post World War II
era of tremendous expansion. Employment with another carrier
in the industry, or in some other industry, was easily obtainable.
Both the railroads and the airlines are forms of public trans-
portation. As such both are public utilities and subject to public
regulation. The experience of the railroads is sufficient to provide
a basis for airline regulation in general. Because of the difference
in background and conditions between railroads and airlines,
however, there is no railroad background which is applicable as a
justification for labor protective conditions in airline mergers. The
Board has not attempted to find justification for its merger labor
policy in the railroads. It has rather based it upon the general
concept of public interest as a policy statement.
We have said on numerous occasions, and we repeat here,
that some realignment of the air transport map by mergers
route transfers would be in the public interest.
112
There is hardly an analogy between a Congressional policy de-
clared in legislation, and a statement by the Board of an ad-
ministrative policy. Nevertheless, this is the only justification for
adopting protective provisions for the airline employees.
The Board further noted that the railroad formula was worked
out in the railroad industry not by administrative order but by
the collective bargaining process:
It would be an act of statesmanship for airline managements
and airline labor organizations to work out by voluntary nego-
tiation a general program to mitigate the hardships to em-
ployees incident to such transactions." 3
In the absence of any negotiated agreement in the airlines,
the Board did not hesitate to provide conditions itself. The rail-
roads' Washington Agreement was used as the basis for the airline
labor protective conditions. 14 The public interest which the
Board found was the benefit which would ordinarily accrue to
the general public through new or improved service or equipment.
This public benefit would be at the expense of employees who
were displaced or dismissed because of the merger. Labor, as a
112 Supra note 39, at 710.
113 Id.
114Id.
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part of the general public, is entitled to protection in the public
interest." 5
Where the main purpose of the merger is economy, efficiency
in operation or retrenchment for survival, one of the results of the
merger may be a loss of jobs to some members of the labor force.
However, in the case of an expanding industry this result does
not necessarily follow. Rather than retrenchment, the purpose of
merger may be expansion. Particularly in a regulated industry
merger may be the easiest method of obtaining coveted new
routes or territories." 6 When intended expansion is combined
with a technical and highly skilled labor force, the result on
labor may be expansion rather than contraction."
7
In its ordinary connotation public interest is a broad term
referring to the community at large, or the people, or at least a
multitude of people. It ordinarily does not apply to private
rights." 8 Labor is a part of the general public and entitled to
protection in the public interest. This is undoubtedly correct if
labor is being used in the broad sense as referring to the general
group of persons employed by industry. It would probably not
be too confining to limit the term to those employees belonging
to all labor unions or even to all employees of a particular industry,
particularly if this concept is in reference to this group's relation-
ship with the balance of society, i.e., the effect on society of the
balance of the general public vis-a'-vis the action of, or to, this
group. This is the frame of reference for the term "labor" when
used in the railroad industry. The problem was not that the
effect of a particular merger might be to displace some employees,
but rather that a necessary concomitant of the policy of encour-
agement of merger would be loss of jobs and an effect on the
economy of the locality or the whole country.
The reference by the Board, however, is to none of these
definitions of the term "labor." Instead, the reference is to a
11r Id.
116 E.g., the case of Northeast Airlines. Both the proposed merger with North-
west Airlines, which was finally aborted, No. 21819 (C.A.B., 1970), and the Delta
merger, which was finally consummated, No. 23315 (C.A.B. 1971), considered
Northeast's Miami-Los Angeles Southern Tier route as the pium. Denial of this
route was the reason the Northwest merger was aborted.
117 The United-Capital merger is such an example.
118 Royal Milling Co. v. FTC, 58 F.2d 581 (6th Cir. 1932); State v. North
Dakota Hosp. Serv. Assn, 106 N.W.2d 545 (N.D. 1960).
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relatively small and private group, those employees of a specific
air carrier involved in a particular merger. These employees are
part of the general term "labor," but it is difficult to find a part
of a particular labor force, concerned only with their private
rights, as being the representative of the general term "labor,"
a valid consideration to include within the public interest. An
attempt to include this narrow concept of "labor" within the
public interest is made more difficult because this is not action in
furtherance of a Congressional policy but only in furtherance of
a statement of administrative policy.119
The case against including employees of the airlines in the
public interest is strengthened by the fact that Congress has
shown that it is able to act where necessary. In the case of the
railroads, it has acted several times, the last time in 1970.110 Yet,
in the case of the airlines, it has failed to act. At the time the
first Civil Aeronautics Act was passed in 1938,"21 labor protective
provisions were already being required in the railroads. 2 2 The
public interest was a prime consideration in this legislation and
yet Congress was silent on labor protective provisions in case of
merger. Since this beginning in 1938, Congress has had the
opportunity to act during the periods of airline difficulty, yet it
has failed to do so. That Congress can act, and act dynamically,
is evidenced by the railroad legislation of 1970.-123 Yet in the case
of airlines, Congress has remained silent.
We have already noted the time and atmosphere during which
the Washington railroad agreement was being considered. We
have also noted that the periods of airline mergers were com-
petely different. Post World War II years were years of an
expanding economy. In spite of short periods of arrested growth,
or even loss, the airlines were enlarging and air traffic was
growing. Would it be in the public interest to insure the job or
protective conditions for an airline employee in 1950? Certainly,
119 United-Western, Acquisition of Air Carrier Property, 11 C.A.B. 701 (1950).
120 The Transportation Act of 1920, ch. 91, 41 Stat. 491; The Emergency
Railroad Transportation Act, 48 Stat. 211 (1933); The Transportation Act of 1940,
ch. 722, § 5, 54 Stat. 905; Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-518,
83 Stat. 1327.
121 52 Stat. 973 (1938).
122 The Washington Agreement, signed in 1936, was a result of the provisions
of The Emergency RailroadrTransportation Act, 48 Stat. 217 (1933).
123 Pub. L. No. 91-518, the legislation providing for Amtrak.
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the situation was considerably different from the 1930's. In 1950,
other considerations had to be recognized. The flying public
would eventually pay the bill for extra labor protection. Was
such a burden justified in a rising economy when jobs, not only in
aviation but in all industries, were relatively easily obtainable?
It is desirable for the airline employee to have the peace of mind
that protective conditions can provide. The question is, however,
whether such can be justified in light of the cost to the general
public; whether such can be justified as part of the public
interest.
Today's airline merger decisions must be considered in the
light of present conditions in aviation. The airlines have been
emerging from a period of substantial red ink. In addition, the
whole economy of 1970-1972 has been depressed. Should this
temporary economic decline in one industry be the responsibility
of the general public? What conceivable public interest is in-
volved which would require the total economy to support losses
to this particular segment of the economy? When the term
public interest is again considered it is difficult to see how the
benefit to individual employees of individual airlines, or for that
matter the cost to the airlines, or even the benefit to the flying
public, could balance the scales vis-a'-vis the economy of the
nation. 24
If the interests involved were analyzed, we would not have
statements such as "it is clear that airline and rail employees
have a need for similar protection.' 1 25 This statement was sup-
ported by no evidence, and it is far from clear why an industry
that is bankrupt and requires a governmental corporation to
continue providing passenger service is comparable to a highly
viable expanding industry, which, while it may have had some
bad years, is generally healthy and expanding. Today, in the
light of our present overall economic situation, the strongest
arguments of the public interest would require only such agree-
ments as would expand the economy. Any agreement of an
124 Whether such is sufficiently desirable to provide employee protection as an
added cost of air transportation, to be paid by the flying public, is a question we
are not considering. The only question for consideration is whether such is of
sufficient public interest to be required as a matter of law in all cases.
325 Delta Airlines, Inc.-Northeast Airlines, Inc. Merger, No. 23315, Recom-
mended Decision of Arthur S. Present, Hearing Examiner, Oct. 26, 1971, at 81.
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inflationary nature would be contrary to the public interest.
Guaranteeing unneeded employment or payments where work
was not performed would be counter-productive in relation to
the public interest in the general economy. Rather than strength-
ening the economy, such policy would lead to further deterioration
of the public interest through broadened inflation.
An additional justification advanced for labor protective
provisions in airline mergers is the public interest in continued
transportation service. If such provisions were not made some
labor strife would follow. Strikes in commercial aviation would
be detrimental to the maintenance of public transportation and
therefore it is in the public interest to provide employee pro-
tection which would avoid labor strife. Airline employees, and
particularly pilots, are in a unique position. Their jobs require
a high degree of proficiency and a vast amount of training. In
the event of a pilot strike, an airline will be shut down, or at the
very most, the airline may have enough qualified management
personnel to operate token service. This will have an effect
on transportation which is adverse to the general public.
If public interest in avoidance of labor strife justifies protective
provisions in merger matters, then it is even more essential that
labor strife be avoided in other matters, such as contract negoti-
ation. It is not sufficient to provide protection in one area only.
This is particularly true because this one area, merger, is an area
of relatively rare occurence to the individual airline. Yet, pro-
vision to avoid labor strife has been made in no area other than
merger. Strikes are not prohibited, nor has any legislation been
enacted requiring employee protection to prevent strikes.
Strikes are not uncommon. The latest major airline strike
crippled Northwest Airlines for 95 days. 26 When settlement
finally came it was based upon agreement between the parties
involved. No effort was made to interpose legislation to prevent
or terminate this strike, nor has legislation been proposed as a
solution to airline strikes which are based on contract negotiations.
Labor peace is always desirable and is a goal of both labor and
management. An argument for public interest in settlement of
any strike can be made, regardless of the industry, and regardless
1
2 6 The walkout by 1619 Northwest pilots ended October 2, 1972. AVIATION
WE & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, Oct. 9, 1972, at 24.
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of whether such industry is public, private or regulated. Yet, in
an area of genuine public concern, that of treatment of public
employees, the direction is toward more employee rights to
enforce contract demands, rather than more regulation, and less
labor right to negotiate and strike if necessary. Today one need
only look at the daily newspaper to see that public school
teachers, policemen, firemen, and other public employees enforce
contract demands through strikes. The direction is toward less
control and more labor freedom. If there is a public policy which
justifies a contrary direction, such public policy must be clearly
enunciated. Undoubtedly, Congress could determine that the
public interest required labor protection to avoid labor strife,
but such would have to be clearly stated and uniformly applied.
In the field of commercial aviation, Congress has not spoken at
all. The Board has spoken, but only in the case of merger. That
labor peace is a specious argument for labor protective provisions
is clearly shown by the fact that it is applied only in the narrow
merger situation, and not to the much more common and
potentially disruptive problem of contract negotiation.
C. Private Employees v. Public Employees
v. Quasi-Public Employees
There is little, if any, justification for labor protective pro-
visions based on the public interest. Nevertheless, such provisions
do exist. Further they have become an established requirement
of all airline merger transactions. Accepting the fact that such
labor protection is in the public interest, a second issue is pre-
sented: whether such labor protection should be limited to airline
employees, or whether protection should be available to all
employees, whether in public, private or quasi-public industry.
Is there any justification for airline employees that cannot, and
should not, be applied also to employees in a private or public
area? Is the term public interest as applied to the airlines herein,
also applicable to private or public industry?
The difficulty in defining public interest has been previously
discussed. 127 Just as nebulous and just as difficult is the application
of the concept of public interest. An example is the public interest
which demands reasonable rates from a utility whether it furnishes
127 See text accompanying footnotes 90-100 supra.
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transportation or energy, such as gas or electricity. The same
public interest is not found in rates charged by private industry.
General Motors is not required to set a reasonable price on its
automobiles, because an automobile is not considered such a
basic necessity that its availability must be guaranteed by the
government. At the same time, there are provisions in the form
of anti-trust laws to insure that the price will be set by compe-
tition. The fear of losing sales to a competitor will keep the
price reasonable.
To say that the public has no interest in the price of auto-
mobiles is not correct. What is actually meant is that under our
competitive system the price of a Ford will keep the price of a
Chevrolet reasonable. To insure that competition and cost set
the price, anti-trust laws prevent Ford and Chevrolet from
agreeing to an artificial price. Because of these factors, govern-
ment supervision, apart from enforcement of anti-trust laws, is
not necessary. It is justified in a public or quasi-public industry
because of limited, or non-existent, competition. Public regula-
tion is a substitute for private competition to insure the rights
of the consumer. There is a definite public interest, an interest
on the part of members of the general public, in prices of all
consumer goods.
There is a public interest in maintaining public services with-
out interruption, and this has been the basis for refusing to allow
public employees to strike. In the area of quasi-public industry,
the government has invoked Congressional sanction to force rail-
road employees back to work because of the adverse public
interest caused by a shutdown of the nation's railroads. Yet, is
there any less interest in General Motors remaining in operation?
Not only can an extended strike at General Motors affect the
individual's ability to buy a new car, and the price he pays for
that new car, but because of the size of General Motors, and
because of the wide variety of items necessary to manufacture
an automobile, a strike will have an impact on many other
industries from glass to basic steel to rubber to gasoline. Certainly
this impact would have an effect on, and could be detrimental
to, a very large segment of the general public.
This same reasoning applies to other private industries. The
whole population is affected if the steel mills close down because
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of the many dependent industries. Are we any less affected if
all the flour millers, or all the bread bakers or all the frozen food
manufacturers were to be closed? As an individual, any one
person may be more affected by one particular strike than another.
One person may not use frozen food, while another may rely on
frozen food almost completely. This will be true whether the
industry is public, private or quasi-public. A school strike is not
of immediate concern to one who does not have children in
that school; an airline strike is not of immediate concern to one
who is not going to the area serviced by the struck airline.
If we speak in terms of any particular private, consumer
industry the answer may be that it is not a basic, public service
and therefore there is no particular public interest therein. If
we speak of the result of a strike in a private, consumer industry
on the basic economy the answer will be different. The result
will have the same public interest as has been found in public or
quasi-public industry. The public interest is the need to main-
tain a strong, profitable and viable company. For proof that
private business, when it affects such, will be a matter of public
interest we need look no further than the present wage and price
controls. 128 There is no pretense of a limitation to the area
ordinarily subject to government regulation. These controls were
set up to require that private business would be operated in such
a manner as to enhance the general welfare of the whole country;
that all business, whether public, private or quasi-public, would
be operated, at least in regard to wages and prices, for the
benefit of the public interest.
In terms of the general economy of the nation, the public
interest will be concerned with all industry. The concern with
industry is not whether it is private, public or quasi-public. The
public interest concern is with reference to the economic effect
on the community. No reason is apparent that would require a
different rule in relation to our basic question, labor protective
conditions in mergers. There may be particular reasons for
applying special rules where special considerations make it neces-
sary. Such an instance is the Congressional mandate in the case
of the railroad employees. Another might be particular produc-
12883 Stat. 376 (1969); Exec. Order No. 11627, 3 C.F.R. 218 (Supp. 1971);
Exec. Order No. 11630, 3 C.F.R. 227 (Supp. 1971).
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tion requirements in the event of a national emergency. Under
ordinary circumstances, if labor protection is in the public interest,
then it should be applicable to all industry with sufficient scope
to affect the public interest, without regard to whether such
industry is, in nature, private, public or quasi-public.
CONCLUSION
The evidence indicates that the basis for labor protective
provisions in aviation is not its peculiar status as a quasi-public
industry. It appears instead that the basis for airline protection
is blindly following the terms provided for the railroad industry,
terms which were provided under circumstances foreign to the
airlines and peculiar to the status of the railroads. The provisions
in the railroad industry were based on the expressed policy
enunciated by Congress, that such provisions in the railroad
industry were in the public interest. This policy has never been
enunciated in Congressional consideration of the airline industry.
The factors which are to be considered in making up the
general term "public interest" should be subjected to continual
scrutiny by the appropriate authority, the Interstate Commerce
Commission, the Civil Aeronautics Board or some other agency.
Such agency has a duty to insure that the public interest is
continually considered so that the statutory standard will be
met, although some of the criteria going into public interest may
change from time to time. However, the right to redefine public
interest in terms of a narrow, particular interest rests solely in
Congress. Until such time as Congress acts, the Board has the
duty, not to follow another industry, but to examine the term
public interest as intended by Congress for the airline industry.
As Congress has not seen fit to narrow the definition of public
interest in the Federal Aviation Act, but rather used it in its
broad, general sense, the Board's duty is to determine the public
interest within this framework. Such factors as benefit to em-
ployees, benefit to the flying public, relation of each of these to
the general economy of the nation, as well as other items which
may be determined important from time to time, must be ex-
amined before a valid determination of the public interest in-
volved in employee protective provisions in airline mergers may
be made.
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In determination of the public interest, it is also necessary to
consider the transportation industry, a quasi-public industry, in
its relationship to public industry and private industry. In an
earlier era there was a special relationship to public employees
and government, based upon the sovereignty of the state. This
might have been a basis for special consideration in a public
industry, but certainly it cannot be the basis for special considera-
tion not available either to public industry or to private industry.
In fact, certain portions of this whole concept upon which this
doctrine was based are dissolving, so that while we still have a
doctrine of sovereign immunity, nevertheless the rights of em-
ployees of public industry are growing closer and closer to the
rights of employees in private industry. While the state is a
sovereign, in terms of employee relations, less and less distinction
is being made between public and private industry.
It is the conclusion of the author that labor protective pro-
visions in the airlines cannot be justified by the provisions in
the railroad industry. Labor protection is an established part
of airline mergers. After twelve years of standard application
there is no question of reversal of this policy. Consideration of
the tenuous ground of such provisions should, however, restrain
further expansion of such provisions until there is clear Congres-
sional mandate.
The necessary conclusion is not that airline employees should
not be entitled to protection in case of merger. Rather, the
question to be asked today is whether only employees in special
situations, such as the railroads, should be entitled to labor
protective provisions as a matter of law, or whether all employees,
regardless of the industry in which they are employed, should be
entitled to some form of protection in the case of merger. I do
not pretend to have the answer to this problem. At this time I
can only present the problem, and suggest that this is an area for
immediate study by all segments of the economy-by labor, by
management and by the government. The answer might be that
our economy now demands that in mergers in any industry, as a
matters of law, employees receive protection against dismissal
or displacement.
It does seem evident that if the answer is no, i.e., if any labor
protection agreement should be arrived at only through collective
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bargaining, without sanction of law, there can be no justification
for special consideration to airline employees. There can be no
basis for one answer for employees of a quasi-public industry
and another answer for employees of private or public industry.
There does not seem to have been any justification for past
special consideration to airline employees, and it does not seem
that there are presently any valid bases for special airline con-
sideration.
